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BEHAVIORAL RESPONSES TO ADVERSE SITUATIONS IN STRATEGIC 
ALLIANCES 
 
ABSTRACT 
In this chapter, we develop a response strategy framework modeling behavioral responses 
to adverse situations in strategic alliances. Extant alliance literature treats behavioral responses 
as discrete and isolated reactions to adverse situations, which we call response strategies. 
Building on the results of a review of emerging literature and empirical research, we propose that 
seven identified response strategies should be conceptualized in a systematically integrated 
circumplex structure. Furthermore, we argue that response strategies are triggered by multi-level 
determinants generating a dynamic interaction pattern of actions-reactions between alliance 
partners. Building on these insights, we advance alliance development literature by opening the 
black box of response behavior and present directions for future research. 
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INTRODUCTION1 
Strategic alliances are “interfirm cooperative arrangements aimed at achieving the 
strategic objectives of the partners” (Das & Teng, 1998, p. 491). The past several decades have 
witnessed enormous growth in alliance activity (Das & Kumar, 2010), and strategic alliances 
have established themselves as cornerstones for the competitive strategies of many firms (Das & 
Teng, 2000). However, alliances tend to exhibit a mix of promise and peril. Whereas they enable 
firms to capitalize on opportunities, managers must remain responsive to the threat of adverse 
situations to avoid the premature termination of the alliance, which may hamper the realization 
of their firms’ objectives (Das & Kumar, 2007; Makino, Chan, Isobe, & Beamish, 2007). For 
example, alliance managers may need to resolve dissatisfying alliance performance issues, 
improve poor working relationships, and deal with the negative consequences of exit barriers, 
such as alliance-specific investments and a lack of attractive external alternatives (Das & 
Rahman, 2010; Tjemkes & Furrer, 2010). In addition, alliance managers’ responses to adversity 
are also triggered by their personalities and influenced by external environmental conditions 
surrounding the alliances. Moreover, the partner’s behavior, including opportunism, also tends to 
influence an alliance manager’s use of response strategies (Das, 2005, 2006; Das & Rahman, 
2010). These multi-level antecedents generate a dynamic interaction pattern of actions-reactions, 
which, in light of the high failure rate of alliances, demands a better understanding of responses 
to adverse situations (Ariño & De la Torre, 1998). 
Consistent with previous alliance studies (Buckley, 1999; Furrer et al., in press; Griffith 
et al., 2006; Tjemkes & Furrer, 2010), we define a response strategy as a reaction to an adverse 
                                                 
1 Parts of this chapter build on ideas that have been outlined and empirically tested in Furrer and Tjemkes (2008), 
Furrer, Tjemkes, Ulgen Aydinlik, Domnez, and Adolfs, (in press), and Tjemkes and Furrer (2010). 
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situation. Although extant empirical research demonstrates that managers use various response 
strategies to overcome adverse situations (e.g., Ariño & De la Torre, 1998; Brouthers & 
Bamossy, 2006), a typology of response strategies in the alliance context remains a work in 
progress. Most alliance studies focus a single type of responses, such as alliance termination 
(Park & Ungson, 1997), opportunistic behavior (Deeds & Hill, 1998), or voice (Ping, 1997). 
Such focused approaches undermine the development of an integrative vision that might clarify 
alliance managers’ use of alternative response strategies. To overcome this limitation, we 
proposed a systematic typology of seven response strategies (exit, opportunism, aggressive 
voice, creative voice, considerate voice, patience, and neglect) integrated in a circumplex 
structure along two active–passive and constructive–destructive dimensions (see Furrer et al., in 
press; Tjemkes & Furrer, 2010). 
Furthermore, prior alliance research examining responses to adversity provides support 
for the importance of alliance-level variables, such as economic and social satisfaction, alliance 
specific investments, and alternative availability (Das & Rahman, 2010; Tjemkes & Furrer, 
2010). For example, Tjemkes and Furrer (2010) found that economic and social satisfaction with 
the alliance and exit barriers, such as asymmetric alliance-specific investments and the 
availability of attractive alternatives influence managers’ response strategy preferences. In 
addition, Das and Rahman (2010) argue that partner firm’s deceitful behavior, such as 
opportunism, is influenced by economic, relational, and temporal factors at the alliance-level. 
However, alliance developmental studies also indicate that personalities of alliance managers and 
leadership style, external environment, and partner behavior influence response strategies. For 
example, Brouthers, Brouthers, and Harris (1997) explain how managers’ leadership styles 
influence their responses to adverse situations; Luo (2007) found that environmental volatility 
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influences opportunistic behavior; and Ariño and De la Torre (1998) developed an evolutionary 
model of alliance development derived from the interaction between partners. However, to date a 
coherent framework recognizing the relevance of multi-level antecedents of response strategies 
is lacking. 
We believe that response strategies in strategic alliances deserve more research attention 
than given to them thus far in the alliance development literature. Therefore, this chapter seeks to 
contribute to this literature by opening the black box of alliance response behavior. To do so, we 
present a comprehensive response strategy framework and its key determinants in strategic 
alliances from which future research directions can be derived. 
We divide the remainder of this chapter into five parts. First, we review the extant 
literature on response strategies to identify a set of seven response strategies. Second, we argue 
that these response strategies can be systematically organized in circumplex structure governed 
by two active–passive and constructive–destructive dimensions. Third, we suggest an 
overarching framework of determinants of response strategies, comprising three distinct levels of 
factors: individual-, alliance-, and environmental-level determinants. We identify and examine a 
list of significant determinants constituting the framework. Fourth, we examine the dynamic 
aspects of the framework to better understand the interaction patterns of alliance partners’ 
behavior. Lastly, we suggest directions for further research and indicate some of the more 
significant implications of the proposed framework. 
RESPONSE STRATEGY TYPOLOGY 
In this section, we briefly review the literature on response strategies and then suggest, 
specific to the field of strategic alliances, a comprehensive typology of seven response strategies 
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to dissatisfying alliance relationships: exit, opportunism, aggressive voice, creative voice, 
considerate voice, patience, and neglect. 
Hirschman’s (1970) exit, voice, and loyalty framework provides the foundation for an 
important stream of research regarding response strategies. Hirschman initially represented exit, 
voice, and loyalty as three alternative strategies along a constructive–destructive spectrum (Leck 
& Saunders, 1992). Extending Hirschman’s framework with a fourth strategy, namely neglect, 
Farrell (1983) and Rusbult and Zembrodt (1983) propose the ELVN (exit–voice–loyalty–neglect) 
typology, which represents a parsimonious conceptualization of response strategies and derives 
its strength from the underlying two-dimensional structure into which the four response 
strategies are organized: an active–passive dimension and a constructive–destructive dimension. 
The alliance context defines the four EVLN response strategies as follows: 
Exit, an active–destructive response, indicates a disinclination to continue the current 
relationship (Ping, 1999). Alliance literature thus refers to exit as an alliance termination (e.g., 
Makino et al., 2007; Park & Ungson, 1997) that represents the ultimate and most destructive 
response to an adverse situation; once the alliance is dissolved, partner firms must find 
alternative ways to achieve their objectives. Voice is an attempt to overcome the adverse 
situation by considering own concerns, as well of those of the other party (Ping, 1997), such that 
alliance managers actively and constructively discuss the situation with the intent to develop 
mutually satisfactory solutions (Geyskens & Steenkamp, 2000; Hibbard, Kumar, & Stern, 2001). 
Therefore, voice represents an active attempt to change, rather than escape from, the situation by 
contacting the partner in a relationship-preserving manner and cooperatively discussing the 
problem (Ping, 1999). However, in silently abiding issues, with the confidence that things will 
improve in the future (Geyskens & Steenkamp, 2000; Hibbard, et al., 2001; Ping 1993), loyalty 
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(also called patience2) provides a constructive–passive response. Managers voluntarily ignore the 
issue and hope that the adverse situation resolves by itself, so they consider undesirable 
circumstances transitory phenomena that will dissipate over time (Ping, 1993). Finally, neglect, a 
passive–destructive response, involves allowing the relationship to deteriorate (Ping, 1993, 
1999). A neglectful manager expends little effort to maintain the alliance (Pressey & Qu, 2007), 
and possible ways to solve the situation get ignored, such that the relationship eventually dies 
(Ping, 1993). 
Over time additional response strategies have been added to the EVLN typology: 
aggressive voice, creative voice, and opportunism (Ping, 1993; Tjemkes & Furrer, 2010; Zhou & 
George, 2001). Hirschman (1970, p. 39) initially conceptualized voice in a relatively neutral 
manner as “any attempt at all to change, rather than to escape an objectionable state of affairs.” 
In the EVLN typology, voice mostly suggests a positive approach, involving the constructive 
discussion of issues with the intent to find mutually satisfactory solutions (e.g., Ping, 1993). 
Following Hagedoorn and colleagues (1999), Tjemkes and Furrer (2010) labeled the EVLN type 
of voice “considerate” and define it as a manager’s active efforts to seek to resolve an adverse 
situation by contacting a counterpart in a relationship-preserving manner and cooperatively 
discussing the problem to improve the situation. However, empirical studies (e.g., Rusbult et al., 
1988; Withey & Cooper, 1989) report low internal consistency for voice, suggesting that it might 
be a more complex construct with several subcomponents (Withey & Cooper, 1989). In addition 
to its positive dimension, voice may have a negative connotation, such as direct aggressive 
criticism or coercion (Hagedoorn et al., 1999; Hibbard et al., 2001). Moreover, expressions of 
                                                 
2  Leck and Saunders (1992) propose the term “patience” to refer to loyalty as a behavioral response and reserve the 
term “loyalty” for the attitudinal component of the construct, in line with Hirschman’s (1970) original 
conceptualization. 
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voice might be aimed at developing creative and innovative solutions (e.g., Zhou & George, 
2001). We therefore distinguish this type of voice from two other forms: aggressive and creative. 
Aggressive voice refers to an active–destructive response strategy that consists of 
persistent efforts by one partner to solve undesirable situations, regardless of the ideas and 
preferences of the counterpart (Hagedoorn et al., 1999). In an alliance context, aggressive voice 
suggests managers forcefully impose their solutions, without trying to avoid conflicts (Hibbard et 
al., 2001). Anecdotal evidence indicates that alliance managers may coerce partners into one-
sided solutions (Ariño & de La Torre, 1998; Doz, 1996). For example, John (1984) proposes that 
hard bargaining, intense and frequent disagreements and similar conflictual behaviors represent 
various forms of aggressive voice. 
Creative voice, the third type, refers to the generation of novel and potentially useful 
solutions to an adverse situation (Zhou & George, 2001). In an alliance context, creativity or 
creative voice consists of a partner trying to overcome the adverse situation through innovative 
solutions (Brouthers & Bamossy, 2006; Doz, 1996). For example, Ariño and De la Torre (1998) 
indicate that during the start-up phase of a joint venture, partners exhibit willingness to find 
innovative solutions, beyond the scope of their contractual agreement, to align their interests and 
preserve the relationship. Doz (1996) also demonstrates that partners proceed through learning 
cycles that enable them to develop creative solutions to deal with adverse situations. Creative 
voice therefore differs from aggressive voice with respect to purpose: Whereas creative voice is 
constructive and takes into account the counterpart’s interests, aggressive voice is more 
destructive and focuses on the interests of the manager’s own firm. Creative and considerate 
voices also are conceptually distinct, in that creative voice pertains to the intention to seek out-
of-the-box solutions rather than cooperatively discuss the problem to improve the situation. 
9 
Opportunism as a response strategy also represents an active–destructive response 
(Wathne & Heide, 2000). Ping (1993) defines opportunism as the intention to increase a 
partner’s benefits from the relationship in ways that are explicitly or implicitly prohibited within 
the relationship. This type of response includes shirking, the use of the circumstances to extract 
concessions from the other party, the evasion of obligations, and the withholding of critical 
information (Das, 2005; Wathne & Heide, 2000). Opportunism occurs when a partner seeks to 
maximize its individual returns at the expense of its partners (Deeds & Hill, 1998; Das & 
Rahman, 2010), which makes it conceptually different from aggressive voice. Although both 
responses imply that a partner has the intention to pursue its individual interests, aggressive 
voice directly targets the firm’s counterpart and attempts to coerce it to complying with its 
demands, whereas opportunism is covert behavior aimed at deceiving the counterpart (John 
1984; Joshi & Arnold, 1997). 
CIRCUMPLEX STRUCTURE 
In this section, we propose that the seven response strategies are organized in a 
circumplex structure that systematically organizes them according to their degree of 
compatibility and incompatibility (Fabrigar et al., 1997; Furrer et al., in press; Perrinjaquet et al., 
2007). We further argue that such a circumplex structure possesses specific characteristics that 
need to be taken into account in future theory development and empirical research on response 
strategy in strategic alliances (Furrer & Tjemkes, 2008; Furrer et al., in press). 
In Hirschman’s (1970) exit, voice, and loyalty typology, the three strategies were 
organized along a constructive–destructive dimension (Leck & Saunders, 1992). The addition of 
neglect by Farrell (1983) and Rusbult and Zembrodt (1983) led to a second, active–passive 
dimension, such that each of the four response strategies is located in one of the quadrants. In 
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contrast with empirical evidence (Rusbult et al., 1988), the two-dimensional structure is built on 
the assumption that response strategies are discrete and independent constructs. However, weak 
forms of exit may verge on neglect, strong forms of loyalty approach considerate voice, and so 
on. Therefore, the two-dimensional simple structure is not appropriate to account for these 
interrelationships between response strategies. Hagedoorn and colleagues (1999) and Furrer and 
colleagues (in press) have proposed and empirically demonstrated that a circumplex structure, 
which orders them according to their degree of compatibility and incompatibility, would be 
better suited to represent the structure of response strategy typology. 
Furthermore, Furrer and colleagues (in press) empirically demonstrated that response 
strategies exhibit a circumplex structure in the strategic alliance context across countries. Such 
as, starting from exit, which depicts the most destructive strategy, and turning clockwise, the 
response strategies are ordered as follows: Opportunism is next to exit, because it is more active 
and less destructive, followed by aggressive voice, which is active but neither constructive nor 
destructive. Next there is creative voice, which is also active but constructive. Less active but 
more constructive, considerate voice comes next. Patience, which is also constructive but 
passive, follows. Finally, neglect appears, involving a passive–destructive response (see 
Figure 1). 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
A circumplex structure possesses several distinguishing characteristics, which provides a 
better account of the nature and interrealtionships of response strategies. First, a circumplex 
structure postulates that the nature of the relationships among variables (i.e., response strategies) 
can be explained best by restricting the location of the variables to the circumference of a circle 
(Fabrigar et al., 1997). The seven response strategies are located in the two-dimensional space of 
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the EVLN typology, but in addition they are also located at the same distance from the center of 
the circle, which means that they have the same weight or importance in the mind of managers 
and therefore represent equal alternatives to overcome adverse situations in strategic alliances. 
Second, a circumplex structure systematically organizes response strategies according to 
their degree of compatibility and incompatibility (Fabrigar et al., 1997; Perrinjaquet et al., 2007). 
For example, creative voice and considerate voice, which are compatible, are located close by on 
the circle, whereas patience and aggressive voice, which are incompatible, are located opposite 
each other. This important characteristic reflects how compatible strategies are likely to be 
perceived as close alternatives in a particular adverse situation, whereas incompatible strategies 
are not likely to be considered simultaneously. 
Third, a circumplex structure is continuous, so there could be interstitial strategies 
between any pair of dimensions (Saucier, 1992). Thus, the circumplex structure can integrate 
new response strategies that blend the original EVLN strategies (Hagedoorn et al., 1999; Saucier, 
1992), which is important as response strategies represent a broad range of related responses 
(Rusbult et al., 1988), which can be refined in future research. For example, we have presented 
three different forms of voice varying in their degrees of activeness–passiveness and 
constructiveness–destructiveness. Similarly, whereas opportunism may be seen as one unique 
response strategy, authors, such as Wathne and Heide (2000), have distinguished between an 
active and a passive form of opportunism. Such a refinement of the opportunism construct can 
easily be accommodated by the continuous circumplex structure of response strategies. In sum, a 
circumplex structure provides a more systematic framework for representing response strategies 
and provides a finer grained conceptualization for future theoretical development. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
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MULTI-LEVEL ANTECEDENTS OF RESPONSE STRATEGIES 
To facilitate a better understanding of the use of response strategies and advance 
empirical research, we believe an analysis of the determinants of response strategies is essential. 
Based on a review of the literature, we propose that the use of response strategies is influenced 
by factors at three different levels of analysis: individual-, alliance-, and external environment-
level (see Figure 2). Extant alliance research demonstrated at the alliance level the effect of 
exchange conditions (i.e., economic satisfaction, social satisfaction, and exit barriers) on 
response strategies (e.g., Tjemkes & Furrer, 2010). Managers’ use of response strategies is, 
however, also influenced by environmental factors (e.g., technological change and competitive 
rivalry). Furthermore, due to managers’ bounded rationality it is critical to add managers’ 
personal characteristics (e.g., experience and personality) as antecedents of response strategy 
preferences. In the next paragraphs, based on a review of the literature, we proposed a 
description of some of the most preeminent determinants of response strategies. 
Alliance-Level Determinants: The Investment Model 
The bulk of research on response strategies has focused on alliance-level determinants. 
Building on social exchange theory (Blau, 1964) and interdependence theory (Thibaut & Kelley, 
1959), Rusbult and colleagues (Rusbult & Farrell, 1983; Rusbult et al., 1988) proposed that 
preferences for the use of active–passive and constructive–destructive response strategies depend 
on alliance-level exchange variables. In the alliance context four variables have been identified: 
economic satisfaction, social satisfaction, alternative attractiveness, and alliance-specific 
investments (Tjemkes & Furrer, 2010). 
Economic satisfaction pertains to managers’ evaluation of the financial outcomes of an 
alliance (Geyskens & Steenkamp, 2000). According to Geyskens and colleagues (1999), an 
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economically satisfied manager considers the alliance a success with respect to goal attainment, 
effectiveness, productivity, and the resulting financial outcomes. Prior response strategy research 
has produced results indicating that economic satisfaction influences managers’ response 
preference on the active–passive dimension but not on the constructive–destructive one (e.g., 
Tjemkes & Furrer, 2010). Low economic satisfaction implies that alliance managers perceive a 
discrepancy between prior expectations and desired financial results (Geyskens et al., 1999), 
which requires an active response to improve the situation rapidly (Das, 2006; Tjemkes & Furrer, 
2010). However, this active response could be destructive, such as acting opportunistically to 
extract additional financial benefits, or constructive, such as using creative voice to find new 
ways to solve the situation. Regardless of how they do it, managers are more likely to “rock the 
boat” to restore performance and increase their economic satisfaction, instead of waiting 
patiently for the situation to improve (Ping, 1993). In contrast, managers who are satisfied with 
the economic performance of the alliance likely behave passively (Geyskens & Steenkamp, 
2000; Tjemkes & Furrer, 2010); they can either be patient or neglect the issue. 
Social satisfaction pertains to managers’ evaluations of the psycho-social aspects of an 
alliance; it implies that interactions with counterparts are fulfilling, gratifying, and facile 
(Geyskens & Steenkamp, 2000; Geyskens et al., 1999). Managers’ perceptions of relational 
quality affect their social satisfaction; if relational quality is poor, the alliance suffers 
dysfunctional conflicts, distrust, and low commitment (Anderson & Narus, 1990). Empirical 
results suggest that social satisfaction in turn influences the constructive–destructive dimension 
but not the active–passive one (e.g., Tjemkes & Furrer, 2010). Low social satisfaction creates 
greater suspicion about a counterpart’s intentions and reduces expectations about the potential 
future benefits of the relationship (Geyskens & Steenkamp, 2000). Therefore, managers 
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dissatisfied with relationship quality within the alliance may terminate it rather than try to save it 
through constructive responses (Tjemkes & Furrer, 2010). To do so, they can respond 
destructively, either in an active way by acting opportunistically or in a passive way by exiting 
the relationship or being neglectful. Partners satisfied with the relationship instead appreciate the 
contacts with their counterparts, and the relationship likely is characterized by trust, respect, and 
commitment (Ariño, De la Torre, & Ring, 2001). In such a situation, alliance managers often use 
constructive response strategies (Anderson & Narus, 1990; Brouthers & Bamossy, 2006), 
whether active or passive. For example, Hibbard and colleagues (2001) found that managers with 
positive views of a relationship place less importance on an adverse situation and instead remain 
patient, believing that the transient negative situation will improve. Geyskens and Steenkamp 
(2000) confirm that socially satisfied managers are more likely to use creative or considerate 
voice. 
Alliance-specific investments represent sunk costs that cannot be redeployed easily to 
another alliance without some sacrifice in the productivity of the assets or cost to adapt them 
(Das & Rahman, 2010; Ping, 1993). These investments would be lost if the alliance were 
dissolved, so they act as exit barriers. Their presence constitutes a source of dependence for the 
firm that makes them, which implies an adverse situation for managers who need to reduce the 
negative consequences of their firms’ vulnerable position (Emerson, 1962). The presence of 
unilateral, alliance-specific investments triggers constructive response strategies and inhibits 
destructive ones (Hirschman, 1970; Tjemkes & Furrer, 2010), because constructive responses 
reduce the risk of losing the investments if the relationship terminates prematurely. In the case of 
high alliance-specific investments, constructive responses may either be active, such as using 
creative or considerate voices to demonstrate commitment to the relationship, or passive, such as 
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being patient to reduce the negative effect of the dependence. When alliance-specific 
investments are low though, managers have more latitude to act destructively, because their 
lesser dependence on their partner means they may exit the relationship, become more 
neglectful, or act opportunistically without fear of retaliation (Das & Rahman, 2010). The results 
of previous response strategy research support this logic (e.g., Ping, 1993; Tjemkes & Furrer, 
2010). 
Finally, alternative availability refers to the extent to which the firm possesses attractive 
alternatives outside the alliance that could enable it to attain its objectives (Ping, 1993). The 
presence of attractive alternatives provides firms with a source of power, whereas a dearth of 
alternatives increases dependence on counterparts (Emerson, 1962). In an adverse situation 
without alternatives, managers have strong incentives to make the current alliance work and 
likely respond actively to improve the situation (Buchanan, 1992). For example, they might 
constructively use considerate and creative voice to ensure their partner collaboration, but 
because they do not depend on their partner, they also can use aggressive voice or opportunism if 
their partner is not cooperative. Moreover, if managers perceive that they have other alternatives 
for achieving their objectives, they depend less on the current relationship, which increases the 
likelihood of exit and passive strategies such as neglect and patience (Ping, 1993; Tjemkes & 
Furrer, 2010). 
Individual-Level Determinants 
At the individual-level, alliance managers’ personal characteristics influence their 
decision making in general, and their use of response strategy in particular. Managers are bound 
in their rationality and their decisions are based on heuristics and cues (March & Simon, 1958), 
which are partly influenced by their individual background and personality (Hambrick, 2007; 
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Pansiri, 2005). Thus, taking into account personal characteristics is necessary, as responses to 
adversity are likely to be influenced by individual traits. A large number of personal 
characteristics have been shown to influence manager’s behavior and decision making, we focus 
here on two of these characteristics related to managers’ personality and documented in the 
response strategy literature: locus of control and risk aversion. 
Locus of Control is defined as a stable characteristic of people’s personality that refers 
the extent to which they view situations as being either internally or externally controlled (James, 
1957) and affects their (non)cooperative behavior (Boone, De Brabander, & van Witteloostuijn, 
1999). The key difference between an internal and external personality is the degree to which 
individuals perceive causal relationships between their own behavior and outcomes. Internally 
oriented people perceive their lives as being under their control. This means that they believe that 
the events they experience result from their own efforts. Externally oriented people, on the other 
hand, believe in fate and chance, and perceive the events of their lives as beyond their control. 
Internally oriented alliance managers, who believe in their power over events, are more likely to 
adopt active response strategies, whereas externally oriented managers, believing they have little 
or no control over events, are more likely to use passive strategies. This is because internally 
oriented people tend to believe that their behavior will lead to reward payoffs compared to 
people with external locus of control, who do not perceive a relationship between their behavior 
and the potential rewards. In an empirical study, Withey and Cooper (1989) found that people 
with internally oriented personalities were more likely to exit and voice their concern in adverse 
situations, whereas people with internally oriented personalities were more likely to use loyalty 
and neglect. 
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Risk aversion reflects an individual’s attitude towards risk, and influences decision 
making (Pablo, Sitkin, & Jemison, 1996; Sitkin & Pablo, 1992). It is a stable property of an 
individual, which is related to his or her personality (Atkinson, 1957). Risk propensity has been 
shown to be a key antecedent of risk-taking behavior (e.g., Sitkin & Pablo, 1992). Within the 
context of strategic alliances this suggests that risk-averse alliance managers are more likely to 
prefer relatively low risks and weigh negative consequences higher (Sitkin & Pablo, 1992), 
whereas risk prone managers are more likely to engage in more risky response strategies when 
facing adverse situations (Stewart & Roth, 2004). Griffith (2006) developed the argument that 
risk-averse managers have the intrinsic need for reducing uncertainties and are likely to employ 
response strategies that increase commitment in order to decrease uncertainties in the alliance by, 
for example, using considerate voice, creative voice, and patience. In contrast, risk-seeking 
alliance managers prefer relatively high risks and are willing to sacrifice some expected returns 
in order to increase their alliance outcomes. They may be more willing to tolerate exposure to 
failure with lower probability of gain in comparison with risk-avoiders (Pennings & Smidts, 
2000) and accept failures more easily (Jaworski & Kohli, 1993). Risk-seeking managers are thus 
more likely to use strategies that may place the relationship at risk, for example threaten to exit, 
be opportunistic, and aggressively voice their concerns. 
Locus of control and risk aversion are two personality traits which seem to be particularly 
important in an alliance context. Other traits, such as the Big Five, are also likely to influence the 
use of response strategies (e.g., Saucier, 1992). Furthermore, in an international strategic alliance 
context, the cultural values of alliance managers also influence their response strategy 
preferences, as empirically demonstrated by Furrer and colleagues (in press) across four 
countries. 
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External Environment Determinants 
Drawing on industrial organization economics (e.g., Porter, 1980), alliance research has 
shown that the environmental context, at least in part, constitutes an important determinant 
influencing strategic decision-making. A firm’s industry environment, in particular, is likely to 
influence strategic decision-making, including the use of response strategies (Ping, 1993; Luo, 
2007). In the following paragraphs, we focus on two key dimensions of the industry context: 
competitive intensity and technological turbulence (Jaworski & Kohli, 1993). 
Competitive Intensity refers to the degree of rivalry between competitors in an industry, 
and is characterized by an industry-wide use of tactics such as aggressive pricing, high levels of 
advertising, products introductions, and adding services in order to prevent the loss of customers 
to competitors (Porter, 1980; Jaworksi & Kohli, 1993). Firms operating in industries with lower 
levels of competitive intensity need to preserve the quality of their existing alliances, as they 
need to secure the provision of resources. Due to a lack of rivalry such firms are likely to possess 
some power over their customers (Caves, 1970), suggesting that they can increase their margins 
and improve their performance without risking losing customers as these customers are “stuck” 
with the firm’s products and services (Jaworski & Kohli, 1993). However, to ensure a continuous 
availability of products and services, they need to secure the provision of critical supplies, 
suggesting preferences for constructive strategies in alliance relationships. Considerate voice is 
likely to be preferred, as firms in industries with low competitive intensity have time to actively 
seek for solutions with their partners to realize their alliance’s objectives. Similarly, loyalty (i.e., 
waiting patiently) is a preferred alternative, since managers have the time to wait for the situation 
to resolve by itself. In contrast, when firms operate in industries characterized by high 
competitive intensity, their customers can choose among a large number of rival firms, thereby 
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reducing firms’ market power. To deal with this potential threat to their performance, firms must 
monitor and respond to their customers’ changing needs and preferences. This also implies that 
the relative importance of preserving existing alliances diminishes, as alternative suppliers could 
be required to satisfactorily respond to customers’ changing preferences. Thus, firms operating in 
industries characterized by high competitive intensity are more willing to put the alliance 
relationship at risk and are more likely to prefer destructive response strategies, such as exit, 
opportunism, and neglect. 
Technological turbulence is defined as the unpredictability and rate of change of 
technology in the external environment (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). Technological turbulence 
poses challenges for managers because of the inability to forecast future technical requirements 
(Heide & John 1990). High technological turbulence limits firms’ ability to internally develop all 
the capabilities needed for their research and development (R&D) activities, because of the 
complexity and rapid technological changes (Hagedoorn & Schakenraad, 1994). Therefore, firms 
are likely to benefit from close relationships with alliance partners and to rely on and preserve 
these relationships to develop and diffuse their innovations (Fynes, de Búrca, & Marshall, 2004). 
In contrast, in markets with low technological turbulence, product and process technologies are 
relatively stable. Firms in these industries are in lesser need of the capabilities of their alliance 
partners than firms operating in markets with high technological turbulence, suggesting 
preferences for constructive strategies. Thus, firms that operate in industries with high 
technological turbulence are more likely to prefer creative and considerate voices and loyalty, 
compared to those operating in industries characterized by low technological turbulence, since 
these response strategies are aimed at maintaining and preserving their alliance relationships. In 
addition, managers in high technological turbulence industries are less likely to opt for 
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destructive response strategies, such as exit and neglect. This is because these strategies pose a 
threat to the relationship they are dependent on. 
INTERACTIONS BETWEEN PARTNERS’ RESPONSES 
In this section, we explain that the use of response strategies is not only influenced by 
individual-, alliance-, external environment-level determinants, but also ones alliance partner to 
create an interaction pattern of actions–reactions. We further argue that this interaction pattern is 
governed by a principle of complementarity that is bounded by the governance characteristics of 
the alliance design. 
Alliance partners may develop dynamic interaction patterns of actions–reactions, using 
response strategies to respond to their partner’s behavior. Developed in personality and social 
psychology, interpersonal theory proposes that patterns of actions–reactions are governed by the 
principle of complementarity within a circumplex structure (Kiesler, 1983; Leary, 1957; 
Wiggins, 1979). Elaborated in 1969 by Robert Carson, the interpersonal rule of complementarity 
specifies ways in which interpersonal behavior evokes restricted classes of behavior from an 
interactional partner, leading to a self-sustaining and reinforcing system. Adapted to the context 
of response strategies in strategic alliances, the principle of complementarity is defined on the 
response strategy circle, such that correspondence tends to occur on the constructive–destructive 
dimension (constructive strategies invite constructive strategies and destructive strategies invite 
destructive strategies), and reciprocity tends to occur on the active–passive dimension (active 
strategies invites passive strategies, and passive strategies invite active strategies) (see Figure 3). 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
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Although correspondence and reciprocity are two distinct interaction patterns, it is their 
combination that governs strategic alliance development over time. The combination of the two 
patterns may lead to either a self-sustaining and reinforcing system of strengthened collaborating 
and commitment within the strategic alliance or may lead to a downward spiral of conflictual 
collaboration moving towards alliance termination. 
For example, Ariño and De la Torre (1998) developed a model of the collaboration 
process in alliances based on earlier work by Ring and Van de Ven (1994) and by Doz (1996). 
The results of a longitudinal case study on two firms engaged in an international joint venture 
provide anecdotic evidence for the interactions between the correspondence and reciprocity 
principles. First, in line with the correspondence principle the introduction of a third party in the 
relationship caused instabilities in the alliance, which was addressed by open communication 
with each other about the hardware problems. The partners understood that building a 
relationship based on constructive correspondence was mutually rewarding. Second, consistent 
with the reciprocity principle, one of the partners’ assessments of the situation caused it to 
actively engage in renegotiation of the terms of the contract in an attempt to restore balance to 
the relationship, whereas the other partner remained passive and waited patiently. In addition, the 
results also indicate that the larger (or smaller) the discrepancy in efficiency and equity 
perceptions, the more (or less) likely the relationship will deteriorate due to reciprocal 
destructive behavior. 
However, in the context of strategic alliances, the complementarity principle does not 
operate in an institutional or governance vacuum. Strategic alliance governance structures are 
purposefully designed to reduce the use of destructive strategies by the partners and encourage 
collaboration. Research on strategic alliance design from a transaction cost theory tradition (e.g., 
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Das, 2005; Hennart, 1988) has demonstrated that alliance contracts are primarily developed to 
curb the potential opportunistic behavior of the partners. For example, Das (2005) explain how 
deterrence mechanisms, such as contracts, governance structure, mutual hostages, monitoring, 
participatory decision making, and staffing and training could be designed to reduce the 
likelihood of destructive responses. Alliance design characteristics are incomplete in nature and 
therefore, as alliances develop and external environment evolves (Doz, 1996; Ring & Van de 
Ven, 1994), they leave open a space for partners’ interaction governed by the complimentarity 
principle. Fore example, the more detailed and complex the alliance contract is the less latitude is 
left to the alliance managers to base their behavior on the complimentarity principle (Faems, 
Janssens, Madhok, & Van Looy, 2008). Alternatively, the less detailed and complex the alliance 
contract is, the more influential will be the complimentarity principle in influencing alliance 
managers’ behavior. In sum, the alliance design represents a constraining arena for the partners’ 
behavior and use of response strategies. 
RESPONSE STRATEGY FRAMEWORK 
In this chapter, we presented the building blocks of a framework that systematically 
organizes seven response strategies to adverse situations in a circumplex structure. The 
framework also incorporates multi-level determinants including, manager traits, exchange 
conditions, and environmental conditions. Together, this forms the basis for dynamic interaction 
patterns between alliance partners constrained by the characteristics of alliance design and 
crafting alliance development (see Figure 4). This response strategy framework has three 
important implications for future research: 
[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
23 
First, we identified set of seven response strategies systematically organized in a 
circumplex structure governed by two active–passive and constrictive–destructive dimensions. 
By doing so, we advance response strategy theory by arguing that the content and structure of 
behavioral responses to adversity are organized in a circumplex fashion. A circumplex structure 
possesses distinct advantages, in that it takes into account the interrelationships among response 
strategies (Furrer & Tjemkes, 2008). In addition, because it is continuous, a circumplex structure 
can integrate new response strategies. For example, prior research added aggressive voice and 
creative voice to the four original EVLN strategies and positioned them on the circumference of 
the circle according to their distinct combinations of activeness–passiveness and 
constructiveness–destructiveness (Furrer et al., in press). However, other new strategies could be 
added, as prior empirical studies, for example, indicated a gap between the adjacent response 
strategies considerate voice and patience, suggesting that unidentified passive responses may 
exist. Further research may investigate alternative strategies in more detail and extend the 
proposed typology. 
Second, we developed an overarching framework of determinants of response strategies 
comprising three distinct levels of factors: individual-, alliance-, and environmental-level 
determinants. At each level, we explain the influence of a set of critical factors. However, to 
validate the circumplex structure, future research should examine the nature of the relationship. 
This is because a circumplex structure not only makes specific assumptions about the 
interrelationships between response strategies but also implies nonlinear relationships between 
response strategies and external variables. It stipulates that when an external variable relates to a 
response strategy, it also relates to the other strategies in a systematic way, exhibiting a pattern of 
positive and negative interrelated associations (Furrer & Tjemkes, 2008, Furrer et al., in press). 
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In addition, future research may also explore how determinants at different levels interactively 
influence response strategy use (Tjemkes & Furrer, 2010). 
Third, we explained the dynamic aspects of the framework to uncover interaction patterns 
of alliance partner behavior based on the complementarity principle. One theoretical implication 
of these interaction patterns is that the use of response strategy path dependent in nature. 
Alliance development is shaped by past and present response behavior (Ariño & De la Torre, 
1998; Doz, 1996; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). Future research should investigate how interaction 
patterns are influenced by changes in the external environment and managerial decision making 
in order to avoid premature alliance termination and strengthen collaboration. 
To conclude, the response strategy framework presented in this chapter contributes to a 
better understanding of firm behavior in strategic alliances. Whereas past alliance studies have 
shown that firms change their behavior over time to solve adverse situations, we extend this 
work by providing a deeper understanding of the response strategies partners likely adopt and the 
factors influencing them. In addition, we also show that the interaction between partners exhibit 
dynamic patterns constrained by alliance design and determining alliance development. Taken 
together, the systematic nature of the response strategy framework implies that a firm can 
anticipate its partner’s behavior. Anticipating partners’ response behavior would enable firms to 
more efficiently and effectively allocate resources to restore an instable relationship or gradually 
disengage from the strategic alliance. 
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Figure 1. Circumplex Structure of Response Strategies 
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Figure 2. Multi-level Antecedents of Response Strategies 
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Figure 3. Partner Interactions and Response Strategies 
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Figure 4. Partner Interactions and Response Strategies 
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